>Has anyone encountered accidents involving glass pressure tubes which >were commonly used for organic synthesis in research labs? One example >of this can be found from Ace glassware >http://www.aceglass.com/html/2008/html/index_html.php?page=714 > >We recently had an accident involving such a pressure tube which was >used for an organic reaction involving phenylmalemide, triphenylphospine >and para-formaldehyde in 3.4ml acetic acid, injuring 2 students who are >working in front of the fumehood. We are still investigating the >accident but initial assessment points to lack of hazard analysis as >well as other safety lapses. > > >Regards >Khaiseng >Department of Chemistry >National University of Singapore >khaiseng**At_Symbol_Here**nus.edu.sg Formaldehyde can thermally decompose into methanol and carbon monoxide, the danger increasing with temperature. All reactions involving glass bombs should be performed in a fume hood *and* behind a safety shield. Whe I was a chemistry professor, I witnessed the aftermath of two such incidents. The analysis of the first one is long, so I will detail the second one in a second email. This account of the first incident is a slightly abridged version of a rather lengthy letter I wrote to various university officials on the date of the incident, October 17, 1995. I've changed some wording to remove names etc. This accident was the result of heating a 25-50 mL sealed glass bomb with, if I recall correctly, methylene chloride. While the incident was rather minor, it could have been much worse; as you read, you will see that it was a useful learning experience: Note: as you read about the fire department "response" keep in mind that when I came out of the building, there were 14 pieces of fire equipment and a command post waiting....hence my frustration that is evident. I'm happy to say that as a result of this incident, our understanding of how to liaison with the local fire department improved greatly and that we had a good rapport with their commander after this. And the fire alarm system was finally upgraded as well. --- Having spoken with the students who were working in the vicinity of room 47 and based on my own personal experience, I present my best analysis of the events that occurred earlier today. I follow this statement with a list of recommendations and a serious protest about the manner in which the fire department's Incident Commander responded to this situation. Earlier today an explosion was heard by students working in the [adjacent laboratories] and by those in the hallway at the time. An undergraduate geology student told me that a "huge fireball" shot out from underneath the closed door of the laboratory when the explosion occurred. A graduate student working next door [to the left side of room 47] at the time reports that the explosion was powerful enough to cause the cabinet doors on the right side of his room to swing open. A graduate student who was standing outside of [a lab 2 doors down on the right] at the time also heard the explosion. Both graduate students raced to the room 47. They found the door closed and detected neither flame, smoke nor heat emanating from the room. They attempted to open the door to investigate further but the door was locked and they do not have keys to room 47. As laboratory personnel are not permitted to work in locked laboratories it seemed unlikely to them that there might be injured workers inside the laboratory and they further decided that breaking the window to the enter the room might aggravate a bad situation if the room was, in fact, on fire. As neither student yet had confirmation that there was an emergency situation inside the room, one student ran to inform the professor assigned to the lab (office upstairs) and the other ran to my office (the closest faculty office). The student who came to my office stated "there's been some kind of explosion or fire in room 47". I was on the phone talking to a colleague, but simply hung up in mid-conversation and sprinted down the hallway to room 47. Upon arriving at room 47 I could not detect heat, smoke or flame. I felt the door and window (which was covered from the inside with white paper, thereby blocking our view of the interior) and found them cool to the touch. I unlocked the door and cautiously cracked it open as I stood to one side. I was aware of the potential for a backdraft situation, but knowing that the room has a recently upgraded high capacity air handling system it seemed unlikely that any fire present inside could have been oxygen-deprived. As I opened the door I could see that thick gray-white smoke filled most of the room except for the area near the door and fume hoods which was clear. Again using extreme caution, I peered around the door and saw that the equipment and materials inside the right fume hood were on fire. I also noted that the sash on the fume hood was open all the way and that there was a 1 gallon organic waste bottle being singed by the flames. While I recognized that this was actually a rather small and well-contained fire, I realized that if this waste bottle were to explode a more serious situation could ensue [an undergraduate laboratory class was in session across the hallway]. Therefore, in full accordance with University procedure, I backed out of the room, closed the door, and told one student to call 911. I yelled to the undergraduate laboratory manager to pull the fire alarm and evacuate the building. I then ran to room 45, grabbed a CO2 fire extinguisher and told the other personnel in the hallway to fetch additional fire extinguishers. I then cautiously reopened the door to room 47 and because the door opened into the lab (to my right) I was able to aim the fire extinguisher at the fire without exposing myself to the fire or other such peril. Still standing behind the door, I swept the hood with the fire extinguisher and succeeded in putting out all but a few small flames. I then used an additional extinguisher to finish putting out the fire and then used a third one for good measure. We pulled the pin on a fourth extinguisher, but did not need to use it. We waited several minutes to ensure that the fire would not reignite and then, with coworkers standing by with fire extinguishers, I removed the undamaged solvent bottle from the hood and unplugged the electrical equipment that was inside the hood. As there were no standing puddles of solvent in the hood or on the floor and we had removed the only remaining flammable materials from the hood it seemed that the possibility of reignition was minimal. Shortly after the fire was extinguished [my department chair and the professor assigned to the laboratory] arrived on the scene. After I fully informed them of the events that had transpired and after discussing with [the professor] what equipment and materials were involved it was plainly obvious to all of us that there was no further danger posed by this situation. They both then went outside to meet with the fire officials who had now arrived at the building but had not yet entered. Expecting that a fire crew would shortly arrive at room 47, realizing that they would need a professional on hand to appraise them of the situation to detail possible health or safety risks and being absolutely certain that there was no danger, I remained in the hallway outside of room 47 with a graduate student present as a "backup" in the extremely unlikely event that something else did happen. We waited patiently for several minutes without seeing a single fireman. We walked to the rear door of the building and saw no firemen, although we encountered several students who were only now leaving the building. I angrily yelled at them "What the hell do you think that alarm means...get out of the building NOW". One of them asked rather derisively "what's your problem?" I replied that my problem was that unless they wanted to be arrested they had better leave. Still not encountering firemen and having no idea what building entrance they would come through, the student and I returned to the hallway outside of 47 to wait for the fire crew. After about 10 additional minutes, some sort of announcement was made over the fire alarm PA system which said something about "evacuate now". Assuming that the firemen were now on their way into the building we remained on scene for another three or four minutes, but when none arrived we exited the building through the rear doors. There I met up with the Incident Commander. I explained to him what had happened, that the fire was out for some time and that the smoke had cleared the room. I tried to detail in the simplest terms possible that not only were there no teratogenic, carcinogenic or mutagenic substances involved but that there was only the most extremely remote chance that the fire could reoccur or that toxic vapors were present. I told him the only equipment that would be needed by anyone entering the laboratory would be gloves (if they would be handling materials) and eye protection (as is required for all laboratory visitors). I then talked to several university safety officials. I gave details of the incident to [deleted] who handled the media swarm that had by then assembled in the parking lot. After our initial contact with the Incident Commander we stood outside waiting. I recall hearing one of the firefighters remark that they were "waiting for the air to clear out in there before we go in." After another 10 or so minutes had elapsed University personnel, not firefighters, were sent into the building wearing Tyvek bodysuits and full-face respirators. I need to make several very important points about this incident. * I must voice my strongest possible concern that the firefighters did absolutely nothing to make a firsthand assessment of the situation in room 47 or even enter the building for at least 20 minutes from the time the fire was called in. I have witnessed several major lab accidents at other universities, accidents many times worse than the minor one we had today, and can confidently state that the response to today's incident was by far the most abysmal. During accidents at MIT and Cornell we had public safety or fire personnel on scene in less than 3 minutes. If today's minor lab fire had not been contained or there had been injured people inside this building it is quite likely that the fire would have done widespread damage and in the process killed or injured occupants and/or firefighters. Why did the fire crews abrogate their responsibilities of ensuring public safety by refusing to enter our building for so long? This is an intolerable situation and I fear that in a future accident the hesitant, paranoid, chemophobic response displayed today will result in a serious injury or death that could have otherwise been avoided. Are we supposed to put out all our own fires from now on? How long would they have waited and what damage would have been done if we had not controlled the situation? Are they going to listen to our advice when we tell them there is or is not a danger? * [Many people] witnessed me make a clear, coherent, concise and informed report to the Incident Commander whose response was a rude, insulting, derogatory and holier-than-thou tongue-lashing about my remaining in the building after the fire alarm (which I had ordered pulled) went off. I got to hear how my allegedly irresponsible action could result in him "having to send my men in to get you out" and endanger their lives. Obviously, if I had thought there was even the smallest amount of danger I would have left the scene immediately. If I had any reason to believe that toxic fumes were present (recall that we had already confirmed that they were not) I would not have remained. Quite simply, I am not a child, a yahoo or a fireman wannabe, but a trained chemical professional with a greater knowledge of the scene than the Incident Commander himself. I recognize and fully appreciate his concerns, but for him to act in such a belittling manner when I had the best knowledge and understanding of the situation is not only rude and insulting but irresponsible and unprofessional. To be honest, I resisted the urge to tell him what I thought of his attitude, but instead elected to maintain my professional demeanor. I later approached him, again in a professional manner, and inquired about what we can do in the future to facilitate communication at future incidents; I will be happy to discuss this at our next faculty meeting. Let me say for now that I have a great problem with his suggestion that I run around outside the building (which you will recall has six widely separated entrances) looking for the Incident Commander when we had already told the police dispatcher where to find the on-site contact. Let me also point out that I found the other members of the fire crew to be courteous and professional, unlike the Incident Commander. * As always in our building, there were many occupants who did not hear the fire alarm. [2 people] came out of the NMR lab (directly across the hall from 47) about 10 minutes after the fire was out and, not because they had heard the alarm (they hadn't) but because they were on their way to lunch. Students in room 20 have this problem all the time; with the doors closed they can not hear the fire alarm over the sound of the vacuum pumps in the laboratory. I was told by a student that the alarm was not heard in the Chemistry-Physics Library which is located one floor above the scene of this incident and which lacks emergency exits. Additional sirens need to be installed in this building and a comprehensive survey of those rooms without sirens should be conducted immediately. * Other students heard the alarm but chose to ignore it (see my account above). Many other departments use the classrooms in our building and it is obvious that some of these outside faculty and students do not have a good grasp of what dangers a fire, particularly one in a laboratory building, pose. False alarms are quite common in our building and this has led to a tendency to ignore them. We need to make sure that all persons teaching classes in this (or any) building evacuate classrooms and laboratories as soon as the fire alarm is heard. I specifically suggest that Chemistry faculty members be asked to check classrooms and laboratories when a fire alarm is sounded and force recalcitrant students and faculty to evacuate. * I want to commend [several people] for their prompt and professional response to this situation. There were several people from Physical Plant who were also were involved although I do not know their names. The TA's who were teaching the undergraduate laboratory in the basement level should also be commended for getting their students out of the building in a prompt and controlled manner. * When I called the Fire Safety office to have the used extinguishers replaced, I requested 10 pound instead of 5 pound CO2 extinguishers. It should not take more than one extinguisher to quench a simple solvent fire in a fume hood (something I have done at least five times at other universities). It may be worthwhile for other faculty members to consider upgrading their extinguisher capacities. * This incident clearly shows the danger of having student desks inside the laboratory, particularly for first year graduate students who are not assigned to research groups and do not have a full understanding of the dangers that may exist. Every effort must be made to provide outside space for graduate student desks, perhaps by converting a few of the smaller classrooms to offices. In addition, I believe it should be departmental policy that TA's not be permitted to tutor students in laboratories, a policy that I enforce in my research group. I am sure that [the professor who occupies the lab] will be giving you a full assessment of the today's events and the chemicals involved. On the basis of information available to me I can make three specific comments regarding the safety practices in room 47. 1) If the window of the door to room 47 had not been covered, the graduate students would have been able to ascertain whether injuries were involved and whether a fire was in progress. I recommend that all laboratories, except for those requiring the exclusion of ambient light for scientific experiments, be required to have windows that permit a clear view of the interior. While this is bad from a crime prevention standpoint, safety should be our paramount concern. I have already consulted with [the professor] on this matter and we have removed the window coverings in his laboratories. 2) The hood sash was fully open when the explosion occurred. As the experimenter was heating a solvent above its boiling point in a sealed vessel (a routine practice that poses no unusual hazard), a safety shield should have been around the vessel and the hood sash should have been lowered. Oddly, it appears that had the hood sash been closed in this particular situation, the accident would not have been minor because the containment of the fire would have ignited the remaining solvent bottle. Furthermore, had the hood sash been fully closed I would not have been able to easily extinguish the fire and the hood would have been damaged from the contained heat. However, I consider this case unusual because there were no workers present in the lab. Had personnel been present, serious injury would likely have occurred, and I therefore recommend in the strongest possible terms that we vigorously enforce policies mandating that all fume hood sashes be kept closed when experiments are in progress. 3) A contributing factor to this incident was the storage of solvent/waste bottles in the hood. My best guess, and this is only a guess, is that the reaction vessel developed a flaw and burst. The resulting glass fragments then broke one of the two solvent bottles in the hood, releasing several hundred milliliters of liquid on the floor of the lab and hood. When this solvent reached the hot plate a flash fire occurred, generating the fireball and "explosion" which is more correctly described as a deflagration (the concomitant shattering of a vacuum Dewar flask would have made this sound like an explosion). We could find no evidence that this flash singed anything outside of the hood, but by examining the spray pattern of mineral oil and glass fragments on the floor of the lab it is clear that material was forcefully ejected from the hood. A second possibility is that the hot plate used to heat the mineral oil bath malfunctioned and raised the oil above its flash point. A third possibility is that the waste/solvent bottles were too close to the hot plate and either cracked or built up enough pressure to burst. Regardless of which of these scenarios is correct, it is certain that at least one solvent bottle was involved in this fire. I therefore recommend that we review and enforce our policies about storage of solvents or waste bottles in fume hoods. My last recommendation is that when the local fire departments come through the building on their semiannual inspections/tours that they talk to faculty members and laboratory workers to fully understand the relative risks involved in these situations. Fire crews should be shown the possible hazards they might run into and be able to ask questions about appropriate responses. We must work to eliminate the chemophobic apprehension that we witnessed today and ensure that the fire department is our partner in guaranteeing the safety of both our organizations. Let me finish by stating once again that this was a relatively minor incident which produced little damage (the hood involved was undamaged and is ready for use). Thanks to the prompt and professional response by our students and staff this incident did not evolve into a larger problem. I look forward to working with you and other University officials to learn from this experience and institute policies that will prevent accidents of this nature from happening again. Rob Toreki -- ================================================ Interactive Learning Paradigms, Incorporated (ILPI) Training, environmental/occupational health & safety consulting Ph: (856) 449-8956, Fax: (856) 553-6154, sales**At_Symbol_Here**ilpi.com http://www.ilpi.com/ Lab & safety supplies? Visit http://www.SafetyEmporium.com/
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